Much of the debate surrounding reform of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) revolves around its insurance market regulation. This paper studies the impact on health insurance coverage of those provisions.
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This paper seeks to identify the effect on insurance coverage of the ACA's insurance market regulations. There is theoretical ambiguity regarding the coverage implications of these provisions: Many of them, such as guaranteed issue, expand access to insurance but also raise its cost. Others, such as the individual mandate, unambiguously increase incentives to be covered but those incentives may be weak. The sign and magnitude of the effect are therefore empirical questions.
Funding, conflicts of interest, and original publication statements: This work received no outside funding. The author has no conflicts of interest to declare. All data are public use and anonymous and only broad averages are reported. No part of this work has been previously published. 1 This differentiation is also of practical relevance reforming the ACA, in light of the procedural constraints of "reconciliation" in the Senate governing what may be changed with a simple majority (provisions directly impacting the budget such as subsidies or the Medicaid expansion) and what requires a 60-vote majority.
To identify the effect of the ACA's regulations on coverage, I exploit the quasi-experiment of the law's introduction in 2014, using data from the American Community Survey (ACS). As a control group, I use residents of Massachusetts, who already faced an insurance market with very similar regulations due to the 2006 health care reform in that state. Overall, I find that the ACA's regulations increased insurance coverage. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that this increased coverage was at least partially due to the individual mandate and that this mandate ameliorated adverse selection in the individual market even in the presence of the other regulations.
To use the ACA's introduction in order to estimate the effect of its non-subsidy provisions, two main challenges must be overcome. The first is that the ACA began distributing health insurance subsidies contemporaneously with most of its regulations. However, the subsidies are given only to those earning less than 400% of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL). Therefore, to isolate the effect of the non-subsidy provisions, I focus on households over that threshold.
The second challenge is the need to account for secular trends in insurance coverage. The use of Massachusetts residents to account for such trends relies on the fact that Massachusetts introduced its own health care reform in 2006, with insurance regulations almost identical to those of the ACA. In sum, I find that the ACA's regulations increased coverage by 0.95 percentage points in the treatment states in 2014.
Neither the sample restrictions by income nor the Massachusetts control group allow for separation of the various non-subsidy provisions from each other. However, using data from 2015, I find evidence that the individual mandate likely accounts for at least some of the results. Although the 2015 data do not permit causal estimates due to unavailability of a control group, they are helpful in that almost all the ACA reforms were constant between 2014 and 2015, while the individual mandate's penalty doubled. With this doubling insurance coverage increased further, by 0.8 percentage points across all states.
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The focus on individuals over 400% of the FPL has the disadvantage of limiting the generalizability of the results to the entire population. However, this is the population of interest when considering the effects of the ACA's regulation on adverse selection. While individuals below 400% of the FPL have premiums capped as a share of their income, and thus little scope for an insurance "death spiral," those over that threshold have no such insulation from rising premiums. The mix of regulations in the ACA has elements that militate both for and against adverse selection: The essential health benefits, for example, would be attractive to sicker individuals at the expense of higher premiums for the healthy, while the individual mandate is aimed at reducing selection by inducing generally broader coverage.
I find suggestive evidence that the regulations overall ameliorated adverse selection. Analysis of heterogeneity in the estimated treatment effect by age shows that the increase in coverage was twice as large among younger individuals (below age 50) as it was among older individuals, consistent with reduced selection into coverage.
| Previous literature
There is a growing literature on the coverage effects of health insurance regulation reforms. For example, Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight (2011), Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski (2015) , and Kolstad and Kowalski (2016) examine the impact of the Massachusetts reform and find that its individual mandate increased coverage and ameliorated adverse selection.
The national reform of the ACA is only now being assessed. 3 However, little attention has been given thus far to the ACA's market regulations. Most recently, Frean, Gruber, and Sommers (2017) study the coverage implications of the individual mandate but not the other ACA regulations. Their primary source of variation is exemptions from the mandate due to lack of affordable coverage. They find that the mandate had negligible (even negative) effects on coverage, in contrast to the findings in this paper. The divergent results between Frean et al. (2017) and the current paper are potentially due to three differences in the respective approaches. First, there may be differential effects for the low income individuals driving the variation in Frean et al. (2017) and the higher income individuals considered in this study. Second, as the authors state, individuals may be unaware of the details of who is exempt from the mandate, biasing their estimates towards zero. The current paper uses the more salient effect of the mandate's existence rather than person-to-person variation, to which people may be more responsive (Chetty, Looney, & Kroft, 2009 ). Third, the linear modeling of the mandate penalty in Frean, Gruber, and Sommers excludes other potential generalized effects, such as hypothesized "tastes for compliance" (Saltzman, Eibner, & Enthoven, 2015) . Thus, the current paper complements the findings regarding the mandate in Frean, Gruber, and Sommers. It estimates its aggregate extensive margin effect rather than the intensive margin effect of an additional dollar of penalty. It further complements their analysis by considering the total effect of the ACA regulations their model does not include, which they suggest could account for up to 40% of the ACA's coverage expansion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides institutional details regarding the ACA; Section 3 describes the ACS data and the identification strategy; Section 4 describes the results; and Section 5 discusses alternative interpretations and concludes.
| THE ACA'S INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS
The ACA introduced numerous changes to the U.S. health care system. In this section, I describe these elements as they pertain to defining the sample and the identification strategy.
The focus in this paper is on the insurance regulations of the ACA, particularly the individual mandate. This provision of the ACA passed into law in 2010 but went into effect in 2014. It requires all U.S. citizens and legal residents to have minimal essential coverage or pay a tax. The size of the tax depends on income and family size: In 2014, it was $95 per adult and $47.50 per child (up to $285 per family) or 1% of family income, whichever was greater. In 2015, this penalty increased to the maximum of $325 per adult or 2% of income. The tax is prorated by number of months in the year without coverage, although a coverage gap of less than 3 months is exempt. The penalty is capped at the national average premium of bronze-level plans ($2,448 for 12 months per individual in 2014).
Some people are exempt from the mandate: those with religious objections to health care, prisoners, undocumented migrants, and members of Native American tribes. In addition, families below the tax filing threshold ($10,150 for an individual or $20,300 for a family, in 2014) are exempt; as are those who would have to pay more than 8% of their income for insurance after accounting for employer contributions and subsidies.
The other ACA insurance regulations starting in 2014 were guaranteed issue and community rating (the requirement that insurers provide insurance regardless of preexisting conditions and with severely regulated price discrimination); elimination of annual and lifetime coverage limits; and requiring all creditable plans to cover essential health benefits. Finally, the mere construction of the state and federal health insurance exchanges may have made acquisition of insurance easier. 4 All these elements of the law remained essentially unchanged between 2014 and 2015.
Subsidies for plans bought on the exchanges are distributed by, among other things, household income. 5 The subsidies decrease as income increases and go to zero at 400% of the FPL; this was about $47,000 for an individual in 2014 or $95,000 for a family of four. I isolate the effect of the insurance regulations from that of the subsidies by restricting attention to individuals in households above 400% of the FPL, roughly 37% of the U.S. population (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014a) . This also renders the expansion of Medicaid to everyone under 138% of the FPL irrelevant for my sample.
As explained in the next section, I use residents of Massachusetts as a control group for the rest of the U.S. population. This relies on the fact that while the ACA's regulations went into effect in 2014, Massachusetts underwent its own health care reform in 2006-a reform which included regulations very similar to those in the ACA. In almost all respects, the individual market regulations in Massachusetts were essentially the same as in the ACA. 6 The main difference between the Massachusetts reform and the ACA was in the formula for the individual mandate penalty. In Massachusetts, the penalty for being uninsured was a fine equal to half the cost of the lowest available annual premium. 4 The requirements for employers to offer group coverage (the employer mandate) were scheduled to begin in 2014 but were postponed to 2015 for employers with more than 100 employees and to 2016 for smaller employers. 5 The subsidies are such that the after-subsidy premium of the second-cheapest silver-rated plan available to the consumer would be no higher than a percentage of income, ranging from 10% at the lower end of the income scale to 2% at 400% of the FPL. 6 The roll-out of the Massachusetts reform was faster than the ACA's. Also, the employer mandate and the ratio of the highest to lowest premium permissible for employers (within a rating group based on industry and geography) were defined differently between the Massachusetts reform and the ACA. This paper does not study the effects of the group market regulations of the ACA, and the Massachusetts regulations were harmonized with the ACA in 2013. The effect of the Massachusetts changes bringing the state in line with the ACA is captured by the 2013 fixed effect (see next section).
In practice these minor changes to the Massachusetts law seem to have had little effect, and coverage in Massachusetts was flat between 2012 and 2013 (see Table 1 and Figure 1 ).
For individuals over age 27, with incomes above 400% of the FPL in 2013, this would have amounted to $1,272 a year for an individual (Massachusetts Department of Revenue, 2013). As stated above, for individuals earning over 400% of the FPL under the ACA, the penalty in 2014 was 1% of income. The average income in my sample in 2014 is $86,392 in Massachusetts and $75,264 in the other states. Thus to a first approximation, the average penalty in Massachusetts actually declined from $1,272 to $864 while it increased in the other states from $0 to $753. Therefore the average change in penalty for the other states relative to the change in Massachusetts is $1,160. 7 3 | DATA AND IDENTIFICATION I use the 1-year estimates of the ACS, years 2008 to 2015. As discussed above, I exclude households below 400% of the FPL in order to focus on those who do not become newly eligible for subsidies under the ACA; this also effectively excludes individuals who could newly qualify for Medicaid under its expansion. I also exclude those below age 26 or over age 65, as they could gain coverage through their parents or through Medicare, respectively.
I employ a differences-in-differences design with individuals living in Massachusetts as a control group. This provides the counterfactual change in insurance coverage in the absence of the sweeping changes in insurance market regulation other states experienced in 2014. Individuals in the rest of the United States make up the treatment group, with the treatment period being 2014. Vermont had its own health care reform in 2006; thus its residents are excluded. 8 In 2015, residents of Massachusetts and the other states are similarly treated, as the mandate penalty increased nationally between 2014 and 2015. Thus, 2015 provides an additional period of treatment with a change in the mandate penalty, with no control group. For descriptive statistics regarding the resulting sample see Appendix Table 1 ; the treatment and control group have similar observable characteristics and are within 0.2 standard deviations of each other on all measures. Identification of the effect of the ACA insurance regulations on coverage in 2014 relies on the fact that Massachusetts already had similar regulations before the ACA. The credibility of Massachusetts residents as a control group can be visually assessed by noting parallel trends in coverage rates between Massachusetts residents and those of the treatment states in the period before the ACA individual mandate takes effect; that is, in the years 2008 to 2013. Such parallel movement is apparent in Figure 1 , which plots the rate of insurance coverage each year, in Massachusetts and the other states separately. This parallel movement suggests that had the ACA insurance regulations never gone into effect for the treatment group, the change in coverage for the treatment group between 2013 and 2014 should have been the same as in the control group.
Similarly, in 2015 Massachusetts and the other states are all treated with an increased penalty for the mandate. This allows further verification that Massachusetts is a credible control group in 2014 by demonstrating renewed parallel movement between Massachusetts and the treatment states. Massachusetts experienced an increase in coverage in 2015 at roughly the same magnitude as the treatment states.
Furthermore, this observation allays a potential concern with using Massachusetts residents as a control group-that Massachusetts may have already been at a saturation of insurance coverage in 2014. However, Massachusetts experienced a significant increase in coverage between 2014 and 2015 despite already high coverage rates once it was treated with higher mandate penalties, indicating such an increase was feasible. Indeed, Massachusetts saw a similar increase in coverage between 2014 and 2015 to the average treatment state; the difference between Massachusetts and the treatments states was insignificant, p > 0.15. The resumption of parallel trends between the treatment and control groups in 2015 with the doubled mandate penalty for both groups validates the use of Massachusetts residents as a control group in 2014.
I estimate the following regression:
where Y τ is 1 for observations in year τ and 0 otherwise; Treat s is 1 for residents of states other than Massachusetts; and α s are state dummies. 9 X contains the following controls: a full set of gender, age, race, marital status, education, and employment dummies; as well as a sixth-order polynomial in income. All observations are weighted by their household sampling weights and standard errors are clustered by household. 
| RESULTS
This section describes the estimated effect of the ACA's insurance market regulations on insurance coverage. The analysis reveals that those regulations led to an increase in coverage which is at least partly attributable to the individual mandate. Furthermore, this increased coverage is concentrated among younger individuals, consistent with the regulations reducing adverse selection. For specifications on subsamples of the population I pool pretreatment and posttreatment years for added precision due to smaller sample sizes. In such specifications, the pre-2014-treatment interaction estimates the difference in level of coverage between Massachusetts and the appropriately defined treatment states in the pretreatment period.
10 Standard errors tend to be substantially smaller when clustering at the state level.
11 An alternative approach to defining treatment in this extensive way is to use an imputed dollar amount of penalty for lack of insurance directly, that is, the intensive margin of the mandate. For a brief discussion of why I choose not to do so, see the Appendix. 12 As noted above, this test does not reject parallel changes between 2014 and 2015 in the treatment states versus Massachusetts, p value = 0.15.
To begin, Figure 1 graphically shows the effect of the ACA regulations on coverage. In addition to the parallel trends described above, the treatment effect can be observed in the sharply higher increase in coverage in 2014 in the treatment group relative to the control group. This visually demonstrates the regulations' effect on coverage: The treatment states experience an increase of about 1 percentage point, with no substantial change in Massachusetts.
The increase in coverage in 2014 in the treatment states relative to Massachusetts is robust to adding controls and is statistically significant. To see this, consider the regression results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 . Column 1 displays results with no additional controls. Column 2 includes the full set of controls. The estimated effect of the Figure 1 . This change in the uninsured rate is economically significant. One way to see this is to consider the share of the ACA's effect on coverage that can be attributed to its regulations. Frean et al. (2017) estimate that the ACA accounted for 3.4 percentage points less uninsurance among non-elderly adults in 2014, of which 60% is due to the subsidies and Medicaid expansion. The other 40% is potentially due to the other ACA regulations.
Assuming that the regulations do not decrease coverage for households below 400% of the FPL, we can get a lower bound on the share of the ACA's effect over the entire population which can be attributed to its regulations. 37% of the U.S. population was households earning more than 400% of the FPL in 2014 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014a) . If only that part of the population experienced any change in coverage due to the regulations then they would account for roughly 0.35 percentage points decline in the uninsured rate that year-10% of the decline attributable to the ACA as a whole. Thus, the share of the ACA's effect on coverage due to its regulations (as opposed to the subsidies and Medicaid expansion) is at least 10%. 
| States contiguous with Massachusetts
As a robustness check, column 1 of Overall, the similarity of this estimate to that using the entire sample is evidence of the robustness of the estimated effect of the ACA's regulations on coverage. 
| States with guaranteed issue
One of the ACA provisions that went into effect in 2014 (and existed in Massachusetts since 2006) was guaranteed issue, the requirement to sell insurance to anyone with only very limited price discrimination. The evidence suggests that the increased coverage in treatment states in 2014 is not due to guaranteed issue: There were a number of states that had guaranteed issue in the years 2008 to 2013 besides Massachusetts, and these states still experienced a relative increase in coverage in 2014. These states were Maine, New York, Vermont, and Washington. Column 2 of Table 2 shows results for the sample limited to residents of these states.
19 13 The uninsured rate in the treatment group in 2008-2013 was 5%. Thus, the increase of 0.95 percentage points in coverage is equivalently an increase of 1% relative to the previously insured rate.
14 Including household fixed effects has little impact, either on the point estimate or on its statistical significance.
15 It would be larger to the extent that regulation led to increased coverage among individuals below 400% of the FPL. For example, if the effect on such individuals were equal in absolute terms to the effect for those ineligible for subsidies, 0.95 percentage points, then regulation would be responsible for 28% of the decline in uninsurance due to the ACA-70% of the residual unexplained by the subsidies and Medicaid expansion.
16 Vermont is included here, but results are virtually identical if it is excluded. Likewise, including Maine to make the treatment states New England also has no substantial effect on the estimates. 17 The difference between this point estimate and the one estimated for the whole sample is statistically insignificant (p value = .69).
18 A state-by-state comparison to Massachusetts was also conducted. Of the 50 comparisons states (including DC) to Massachusetts, all but three had larger declines in uninsurance than Massachusetts in 2014. For half these states, these differences were statistically significant, while those that were not tended to be small population states. The three states whose point estimate did not indicate a larger decline in uninsurance than Massachusetts were Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Tennessee; in none of these cases was the difference from Massachusetts significant. These state-by-state estimates are available upon request.
The estimate of the causal effect of the ACA regulations excluding guaranteed issue is very similar to that from the full sample, at 1 percentage point.
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The above results notwithstanding, guaranteed issue can be implemented in a variety of ways and the states included in this section varied in the extent of community rating that accompanied their preexisting guaranteed issue regulations. Thus, this comparison provides only suggestive evidence that the increased coverage in 2014 in treatment states relative to Massachusetts does not stem from newly guaranteed issue.
| The role of the individual mandate
The design using differential changes in coverage between Massachusetts and the other states in 2014 cannot distinguish between the effects of the different simultaneously implemented ACA regulations, aside from guaranteed issue. However, the data from 2015 provide suggestive evidence for the individual mandate accounting for some of the insurance gains in the treatment states in 2014. This is because between 2014 and 2015 there were no large changes in the ACA with the exception of two provisions. The first was a doubling of the individual mandate penalty from 1% of income to 2% of income, as detailed in Section 2. The second was introduction of the mandate for employers with more than 100 employees.
The continued increase in coverage between 2014 and 2015 in the treatment states and in Massachusetts is consistent with the increased individual mandate penalty causing more individuals to acquire insurance. This increase is apparent in Figure 1 . Based on the estimates in column 2 of Table 1, the treatment states experienced an average increase 20 The estimated percentage change in the uninsurance rate is also similar for the states with guaranteed issue, at 22%. This can be seen in Figure 2 . The left-hand panel displays rates of coverage by insurance purchased directly by an individual or their family member. The right-hand panel shows coverage by an employer or union plan. It is evident that the long-term decline in the latter continues unabated in 2014 and 2015 in both treatment states and in Massachusetts. This result is also borne out in regression analysis (results available upon request).
With no control group for 2015, it is not possible to rule out that the observed trends result from secular changes unrelated to the ACA or from delayed effects from the 2014 provisions. Nevertheless, they provide suggestive evidence that the increased coverage in 2014 was at least partially attributable to the individual mandate.
| Age heterogeneity in the treatment effect
In the absence of information on health in the ACS, one suggestive way to assess the impact of the ACA regulations on adverse selection is to consider whether their treatment effect differs by age.
Estimating the effect of the regulations separately for individuals below and above the median age in the sample (49) shows that for the young, the regulations are estimated to increase coverage by about 1.2 percentage points in 2014; for the old the estimated increase in coverage is just half that, at 0.06 percentage points (see columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 ). This difference is highly significant (p value < .01).
22 Therefore, the bundle of ACA market regulations on balance seems to ameliorate adverse selection among those over 400% of the FPL; this is crucial when considering the possibility of unraveling in the individual market for those not insulated from rising premiums by subsidies.
| DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
One concern regarding the research design is that the ACS may not accurately measure whether individuals are above the 400% of the FPL cutoff for subsidy eligibility. If individuals are mistakenly classified as being above the cutoff, they may receive subsidies which could drive the results showing increased insurance coverage. To deal with this concern the 21 The fact that the mandate for large employers did not increase employer coverage is unsurprising, as 98% of employers with more than 200 employees already offered insurance before the employer mandate went into effect (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014b) . 22 Dividing the sample by age quartiles reveals a consistent pattern, as does including a linear or quadratic interaction of age and treatment status. These results and those by other dimensions of heterogeneity in the treatment effect, such as gender or education, are available upon request. analysis is repeated using only individuals in households above 500% of the FPL. The results are qualitatively similar and are available upon request. Another concern in interpreting the results is that the insurance subsidies distributed to households below 400% of the FPL could drive the observed effect by inducing healthy individuals in households excluded from the sample to buy insurance, causing a decline in premiums for those in the sample. However, this interpretation is inconsistent with the treatment effect being larger among the young, requiring that their premiums be disproportionately reduced by an improvement in the risk pool driven by increased coverage among the poor. But premiums for the young were already relatively low before the ACA and should have weakly increased in 2014 once discrimination on age and previous health status was limited. Consequently, while reduced selection in the individual market could be expected to lower premiums for the elderly, this is not true of the young.
In sum, this paper documents increases in coverage due to ACA individual insurance regulation of almost 1 percentage point. 2015 evidence suggests that this estimate is attributable at least in part to the individual mandate. Some alternative mechanisms, such as guaranteed issue, are less consistent with the data. Furthermore, the increase in coverage is concentrated among younger individuals, suggesting that the ACA regulations ameliorated adverse selection in the individual market.
The ACA is subject to ongoing debate. As efforts to replace it increasingly focus on its regulations, it is of interest to assess how important they were in achieving the Act's goals, an increase in insurance coverage chief among them. This paper provides a lower bound for the answer to that question, concluding that the ACA's non-subsidy or Medicaid provisions account for at least 10% of the decline in the uninsurance rate due to the Act.
